Democracy Beyond the Nation State?
Transnational Actors and Global Governance

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Introduction

The growth of governance beyond the nation state is one of the most distinct political developments during the last half century. The early post-world-war period witnessed the establishment of a large number of influential international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank (IBRD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Community (EC). In recent decades, these state-dominated international organizations have been supplemented with governance arrangements that involve public as well as private actors, or even are organized entirely on a private basis. Global governance has become the favored term for denoting these complex patterns of authority in world politics today, involving a variety of actors and networks along with states and international institutions (Rosenau 1995).

The rationale of global governance arrangements, and their principal source of legitimization, has traditionally been their capacity to address joint problems and generate benefits for states and societies. Yet, in recent years, international institutions and other public arrangements have increasingly been challenged on normative grounds, and found to suffer from democratic deficits (Held and Koenig-Archipugi 2005). Issues that previously were the domain of democratic decision-making at the national level have been shifted to the international level, but the means of decision-making at this level to a large extent remain the exclusive preserve of state officials and international bureaucrats, with limited opportunities for participation by civil society actors.

The legitimacy of global governance is today at the top of the agenda of national governments, international institutions, and civil society organizations – and rightly so. Whereas societies around the world demand that global governance be developed to handle joint challenges, such as climate change and sustainable development, limits in the perceived legitimacy of these arrangements risks undermining their potential to make a difference. Even if most expressions of failing popular support are non-violent, dissatisfaction with the existing institutional order was an integral part of dramatic protests in Seattle, Prague, Gothenburg, and Genoa, in association with meetings of the WTO, G7, and the EU. The beginning of efforts to address these legitimacy problems reflect the realization that global governance, in the long run, can only be effective to the extent that it is also perceived as legitimate by the citizens affected.

The purpose of this research program, which will be undertaken in collaboration between the Departments of Political Science at Lund University and Stockholm University, is to address the role of transnational actors in the process of democratizing global governance. This term is generally used to denote the broad range of private actors that organize and operate...
across state borders, including multinational corporations, party associations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks, and social movements (Risse 2002). Increasingly, the latter types of transnational actors are conceptualized as an emerging global civil society, whose participation in international policy-making holds the promise of a democratization of global governance (Scholte 1999; 2007). Transferring models of democracy originally developed for the national context, and developing new models of democracy tailored for the international level, normative democracy theorists have advanced blueprints for how global governance arrangements may be reformed to integrate civil society actors and thus meet the standards of democratic decision-making. Meanwhile, international institutions are responding to the critique by gradually and unevenly opening up means of participation for transnational actors, whereas NGOs, advocacy networks, and social movements, for their part, emphasize the democratic merits of enhancing their involvement in global policy-making.

This research program is guided by the overarching question of whether and how transnational actors contribute to a democratization of global governance. We address this question by exploring three scholarly themes: (1) transnational actors and the democratization of international institutions, (2) democracy and public-private partnerships in global governance, and (3) the democratic credentials of transnational actors. Within each of these themes, we identify sub-questions and relate the contribution of the program to specific and ongoing scholarly debates.

The program moves beyond existing research in three prominent respects. First, we combine normative political theory and thorough empirical research. Whereas existing research on global democracy has had a strong emphasis on normative democratic theory, empirical process-oriented studies are still lacking. We have ambitions in both fields. We contribute to the development of normative democratic theory by assessing the extent to which national democratic models are transferable to the international domain, or whether new models of democracy must be developed to fit the conditions of global policy-making. Moreover, we trace the implications of alternative models of democracy for the prospects of democratization through transnational actors. In this context, we also address the broader question of whether democracy is an appropriate ambition and source of legitimation in global governance. Yet most original is the bold empirical agenda of the program, which explores the origins and effects of actual attempts to democratize international institutions, and assesses the democratic credentials of public-private partnerships and transnational actors themselves.

Second, we adopt an ambitious comparative research design. Comparative studies are frequently called for, but less frequently conducted, in the social sciences. The reason is the considerable investment in time and money required for large-scale comparisons. A long-term program of this kind allows for a genuinely comparative approach. As opposed to the limited empirical research on democracy in global governance, which is heavily dominated by single-case studies, we operate with a broad comparison across issue-areas. We include cases from issue-areas where transnational activity is particularly prominent, such as trade, development, and the environment, but also from issue-areas where state interests circum-
scribe the room for transnational organization, such as health, security, and migration. Our ambitious comparative design also allows for the inclusion of cases from different parts of the world, hence avoiding the Northern or Western bias that characterizes much previous research on transnational organization.

Third, we include and assess the full spectrum of transnational actors. Whereas existing studies of transnational organization in global governance tend to focus either on non-profit actors (NGOs, movements and networks) or profit actors (multinational corporations), we study processes that involve both categories, and assess the democratic credentials of both categories. It is often assumed that non-profit actors are more conducive to democracy than profit actors. Yet NGOs and social movements confront issues of internal democracy and representativeness as well, and multinational corporations have in recent years adopted codes of conduct and entered into partnerships that demand greater social responsibility.

Identifying the Research Frontier: Three Themes

The frequently used expression global governance is far from uncontroversial. First, is there such a thing as a global realm? Can we posit “the global” as a sui generis level of analysis? Most current analyses of global governance view “the global” as the sum total of all levels, from the local to the supranational (for a discussion of this problematic, see Bartelson 2006). In general, the term “governance” implies the formulation, implementation, monitoring, enforcement and review of rules and regulatory institutions. Global governance, in particular, is about coordinat-

ing multiple, interdependent actors and refers to the patterns that emerge from regulatory efforts by these actors in the absence of a central authority. It has emerged as a key concept in the vocabulary of international relations, not least in UN circles. Politically, the global governance concept has served as a useful emblem for the program of reforming the UN and other international organizations. In this vein, the Commission on Global Governance understood the concept as “a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making” (Our Global Neighbourhood 1995: 4). This touches on our first scholarly theme, the democratization of international institutions.

Global governance also implies that states are no longer – if they ever were – able to monopolize interactions of political significance across national borders. To be sure, state governments are central nodes in global governance systems, as are intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). To that extent, global governance implies a strong element of “governance with governments” (Zürn 2000: 5-6). But it also involves an expanding and variegated community of transnational actors and movements, “activists beyond borders” (Keck and Sikkink 1998), which are often lumped together under the label of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as powerful economic actors transcending national borders. “Epistemic authority,” that is, deference associated with specialized knowledge, along with “marketized institutions,” that is, a tendency to adopt market principles of organization and social intervention, are associated with global governance (Hewson and Sinclair 1999: 17-18). Hence, public-private partnerships represent our second theme.

Democratic values may apply not only to existing international institutions or
emerging public-private partnerships, but also to the plethora of transnational actors that form the nodes in networks of global governance. There has been a tendency to idealize “civil society” actors as democratic forces. Yet, as Jan Aart Scholte (2002: 299) has pointed out, “we do well to balance enthusiasm for civil society engagement of global governance with due caution” and “demand of civic associations that they not merely assert – but also demonstrate – their democratic credentials.” An inquiry into the democratic credentials of transnational actors therefore constitutes our third theme.

Transnational Actors and the Democratization of International Institutions

In the complex patterns of actors and networks involved in global governance, international institutions, multilateral conferences and other public governance arrangements are important components, through which states seek to regulate activities in fields such as trade, finance, environment, security, social affairs, and human rights. One of the most profound trends in global governance over the last decade is the growing extent to which international institutions are challenged on normative grounds by both scholars and activists. Critics portray international institutions as suffering from “democratic deficits,” when measured against traditional standards of democracy, such as participation, accountability, and transparency. This debate first arose in relation to the European Union in the early 1990s, but has since spread to other international institutions, notably the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and central UN bodies. According to the critics, effectiveness and problem-solving capacity are no longer a sufficient source of legitimacy for international institutions, but must be supplemented with more democratic procedures of decision-making. Formulated in the frequently used terms of Fritz Scharpf (1999), global governance must rest on input legitimacy as well as output legitimacy.

The Debate. Existing literature on the democratic credentials of international institutions and governance arrangements features a scholarly debate with three main positions. According to the first position, democracy beyond the nation-state will be impossible to achieve, because of the absence of a transnational demos and a coherent electorate (Dahl 1999; Scharpf 1999). Proponents of this pessimistic position urge caution in conferring authority to international institutions, since such delegation is always likely to involve costs to democracy. Advocates of the second position in the debate question the diagnosis of a democratic deficit in global governance, and thus claim that there are few reasons to engage in democratizing reforms of international institutions (Majone 1998, 1999; Keohane and Nye 2001; Moravcsik 2002, 2005; Kahler 2005). These should be compared, not to ideal models of democracy, but to the general practice of today’s advanced industrialized democracies, which falls short of these ideal models. Moreover, international institutions already involve forms of democratic control, notably through national governments. By contrast, advocates of the third position recognize the presence of a democratic deficit, and consider it both desirable and possible to democratize international institutions and governance arrangements (e.g. Held 1995, 2005; Zürn 2000, 2005; Scholte 2002, 2005; Lord 2004; Patomäki & Teivainen...
This perspective, which is sometimes referred to as cosmopolitan democratic theory, spans a rich variety of views and standpoints concerning the specific mechanisms through which international institutions can become more democratic.

Our Contribution. This research program departs from the third position in this scholarly debate about the democratic credentials of international institutions. Acknowledging the presence of legitimacy problems in global governance today, this program explores the extent to which transnational actors can contribute to a democratization of international institutions and governance arrangements. In this process, we aim to move beyond conventional notions of democracy based on the domestic polity, and endeavor to rethink how democratic values of accountability, representation, and transparency may work in the global arena. More specifically, this program addresses three broad research questions.

The first question is normative in nature and pertains to alternative proposals for ways of democratizing international institutions and governance arrangements. How could the involvement of transnational actors help overcome the democratic deficits of international institutions? This question has generated increasing scholarly interest in recent years, and has produced a range of proposals, as noted above. We will depart from the threefold distinction between competitive democracy, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy, and map how various proposals for the democratization of international institutions relate to these models (Elster 1986; Karlsson 2001). Are democratic models developed for the domestic context applicable and realizable in the international realm, or do we need to conceive of democracy in novel terms, as suggested by proponents of cosmopolitan democracy? How can we conceive of “the people” in global governance (Näsström 2003; Doucet 2005)?

The second research question is positive rather than normative, and addresses actual steps toward the democratization of international institutions, as conceptualized in the different models of global democracy. How can we explain processes of democratization, or their absence, in international institutions? Existing empirical evidence testifies to a general trend toward more transnational participation, but considerable variation across institutions in extent and shape. So far, this question has received limited attention in existing literature (Raustiala 1997; O’Brien et al. 2000; Staissch 2004). Our ambition is to formulate and test a set of alternative explanations, drawing on theories of institutional design in international relations, as well as theories of democratization in comparative politics. Does the increasing involvement of transnational actors in international policy-making reflect a shift in norms about legitimate governance, as constructivists in IR would suggest, or the realization that transnational actors can perform functions that states and international institutions are unable to conduct themselves, as rationalists would propose? To what extent are theories of democratization within states useful in explaining democratizing reforms at the international level?

The third question we address pertains to the consequences of democratizing international institutions and governance arrangements. What are the effects of involving transnational actors in international policy-making for its legitimacy, effectiveness, and distributional implications? So far, this question, too, has been
the object of limited systematic research (Kahler 2005; Zürn 2005). Still preoccupied with the diagnosis and potential cures of the democratic deficit in global governance, existing scholarship is rich in assumptions and untested hypotheses, but poor in longitudinal studies of the effects of transnational involvement. Our ambition is to generate conditional answers to this open-ended empirical question of consequences. Do democratizing reforms actually enhance the legitimacy of international institutions in domestic societies, or rather give rise to new legitimacy problems, related to the representative qualities of transnational actors? Does the engagement of transnational actors generate more effective policy-making, or make decision-making more cumbersome and less responsive? How does the inclusion of transnational actors affect the distributional implications of international cooperation, for instance, the division of gains between developed and developing countries?

**Democracy and Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance**

Global governance consists not only of international institutions but also of private actors of various kinds. The global regulatory activity in recent years by the non-profit actors of transnational civil society as well as the profit-oriented actors of the global market can be described as a regulatory explosion (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). We are indeed witnessing a “golden era of regulation” (Levi-Faur and Jordana 2005). This has given private actors authority in areas that traditionally belonged to the state and the public sector. A recent development pointing in this direction is the proliferation of partnerships between public and private actors in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and development. The Global Compact is a well-known example of this.

The Debate. Research on private authority in international affairs raises issues of how to conceptualize the kind of influence exercised by private actors, as indicated through categorizations such as “market authority”, “moral authority” and “illicit authority” (Hall and Biersteker 2002). A common point of departure in the literature on private authority in global governance is the notion that authority has to do with legitimized power, which is not monopolized by state actors (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Higgott et al. 2000). Regulatory activity may entail regulation of certain spheres that have already been regulated within the nation-state and in international law. Other forms of regulatory activity take the form of an expansion into “virgin territories” (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006: 3). In other areas, processes of privatization and outsourcing have created an important regulatory space for private actors in matters that used to be a prerogative of the public sector (Rhodes 1997; Drache 2001; Rosenau 2002). Regulatory tools outside the state-centric sphere are not primarily legally binding regulations (hard law), but rather variants of soft law, such as standards, ranking and monitoring frames and codes of conduct (Hood et al. 1999; Mörth 2004). One prominent example is the regulation of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) field, which entails plenty of examples of new modes of public-private partnerships (see, e.g., Haufler 2001; Bäckstrand 2006). In broader terms, the scholarly debate concerns boundary drawing between public and private spheres of responsibility. In short, the dis-
tinction between private and public spheres, fundamental in the social sciences and in liberal thinking on democracy, is in flux (Hirst 1997; Weintraub and Kumar 1997).

Our Contribution. Efforts at grasping the character of private authority in international affairs have opened up a range of issues central to the present research program. A principal contribution by this program will be to examine both how transnational actors in public-private partnerships can contribute to a democratization of global governance, and how regulation based on such partnerships and soft law arrangements might challenge democratic values. We acknowledge that public-private partnerships can have both positive and problematic consequences for the transfer of democratic values to a transnational setting, and we emphasize the need for comparisons of different kinds of partnerships in different issue-areas to gain further understanding of this tension. Whereas existing literature is strong in mapping the growth and variety of public-private partnerships, research on the democratic legitimacy of these arrangements is still lacking.

In line with this, we will identify new participatory practices that institutionalize relationships between the state, civil society and the market, and evaluate those practices from the perspectives of democratic theory. Here, the notion of accountability is central to our inquiries. As public and private spheres of responsibility have become more diffuse and interwoven, chains of accountability become more complex. Transnational civil society groups can advance democratic accountability in global governance through increasing transparency, policy monitoring and review, pursuit of redress (to auditors, ombudspersons, parliaments, courts, media), and promotion of formal accountability mechanisms (Scholte 2004: 217-22). Such potentially democracy-strengthening activities will be analyzed systematically in this program. We will make a contribution by connecting the empirical examination of partnerships involving NGOs, business actors, states and international institutions to normative democratic questions concerning who ought to regulate social and environmental standards in order to safeguard democratic values.

We will also contribute to the study of the democratization of global governance through assessing public-private partnerships in a transnational setting in light of the balancing act between effectiveness and democratic values (see e.g. Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 126). How is the tension between effectiveness, on the one hand, and accountability, participation and deliberation, on the other hand, manifested in transnational partnerships? Such partnerships, we argue, ought to be seen as complementary to interstate organization and regulation, but the nature of this complementary relationship needs to be understood better. Does, for example, the proliferation of partnerships lead to weaker demands on states to fulfil their obligations to protect the environment, human rights and security?

In sum, reconfigurations of public and private in a global governance setting will be examined empirically and normatively in our program. Arguably, on a more overarching level, boundaries between private and public actors are more fluid than ever before. We are interested in the question whether the relationship between public and private actors has evolved beyond an exchange relation between states and markets. Does it make sense to speak of a global public domain—“an arena of social life with its own rules,
norms and practices, cutting across the state and market and other public private agencies” (Drache 2001: 4), in which states are embedded in a broader institutionalized arena concerned with the production of so-called global public goods (Ruggie 2004: 500)? Or are the borders between the sectors and the distinction between public ends and private means upheld in interaction between the range of actors participating in global governance arrangements?

Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors

When analyzing the potential of transnational actors to contribute to a democratization of global governance, it is important to examine the democratic credentials of these actors. To what extent are such actors internally democratic, or accountable to their constituencies and members? Are there democratic deficits not only in global governance, but also within the transnational actors whose participation in international policy-making is sometimes put forward as a solution to the lack of transnational democracy? Transnational corporations are generally not subjected to demands of democratic governance, but are confronted with issues of accountability in relation to shareholders, which may be perceived as the “demos” of TNCs. Nevertheless many other people are (sometimes fundamentally and in a negative way) affected by the operations of large corporations. Hence, market actors should not be allowed to escape critical evaluations of their democratic credentials, although the criteria for evaluation might be partly different than for other actors. Most research, however, has been devoted to the democratic credentials of transnational civil society actors, which are often perceived as a more democratic type of actor in world politics. Hence, it is especially important to examine to what extent these actors suffer from democratic deficits.

The Debate. Three basic positions in the debate concerning the democratic credentials of transnational (civil society) actors can be identified. First, there has been a tendency, especially in the earlier research on “global civil society” in the 1990s, to portray civil society actors in a romantic way as champions of democracy and other normatively “good” causes (cf. Smith et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000). A second position in the debate is represented by those sympathizing with other powerful actors in global governance (such as governments, transnational corporations and multilateral institutions). From this perspective, the legitimacy of transnational civil society actors is questioned, often in a very sweeping and one-sided way (cf. the critical evaluation of NGOs from the perspective of business presented in Doh and Teegen 2003). More constructive criticism comes from a third position, offering systematic analyses of democratic problems and prospects of transnational civil society actors. During the last decade there has been a tendency to pay more attention to democratic shortcomings of NGOs (Fisher 1997; Hudock 1999) and the concept of “uncivil society” (Kopecky and Mudde 2003; cf. Ahrne 1998; Chambers and Kopstein 2001) has been introduced. While there do exist overviews of different aspects of transnational civil society actors’ democratic legitimacy (Van Rooy, 2004; Nelson 2002; Collingwood and Logister 2005; Frangonikolopolulos 2005), there is still a lack of systematic, comparative studies of the democratic credentials of transnational civil society actors.
Our Contribution. Unlike most previous research we will compare the democratic credentials of the whole spectrum of transnational actors. In the discussion of democratic credentials of transnational civil society actors, problems of representation and accountability are central. This is the first major set of democratic deficits that needs to be addressed. Critics of NGOs often point out that their membership might be very limited, perhaps excluding most of the people on whose behalf the NGO claims to speak. The lack of representation within transnational civil society groups may reproduce structural inequalities based on class, gender, nationality, ethnicity, religion etc. (Scholte 1999: 30). This problem of representation will be analyzed systematically across issue-areas.

Furthermore, the internal democracy of transnational civil society actors is often problematic, as formal mechanisms for representation and accountability tend to be lacking. Accountability implies that power-wielders are judged in relation to a set of standards and sanctioned, if those holding them accountable decide they have failed to fulfill their responsibilities (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005; Keohane 2006). One crucial question is: Who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable? NGOs may be accountable to internal as well as external stakeholders (Grant and Keohane 2005: 38; cf. Van Rooy 2004: 73). TNCs tend to be accountable only to shareholders. Within this research program we will make theoretical as well as empirical contributions to the emerging literature on accountability mechanisms in global governance (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Mason 2005).

However, we will also go beyond this literature and rethink the concept of representation. Margaret Keck (2004: 45) argues that civil society activists in global governance institutions represent “positions rather than populations, ideas rather than constituencies.” This is what she calls “discursive representation.” In a similar argument Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) claim that the terms representation and accountability are not fully applicable to transnational NGOs. A better concept is “political responsibility” (cf. Hudson 2001). Others have identified new “technologies of credibility building” as replacing universalistic mechanisms of representation in global governance (Carlarne and Carlarne 2006). While taking the problems of representation and accountability within transnational actors seriously, we acknowledge the need for conceptual and theoretical innovations that go beyond the conventional framework of a democratic, territorially based state. Hence we ask questions like: What are the specific democratic credentials of different types of transnational actors when it comes to representation and accountability? How do the representativeness and accountability of transnational actors affect the possibilities for democratizing global governance? What forms of representation and accountability are empirically viable and normatively desirable for different types of transnational actors? What reconceptualizations are needed to better understand the democratic credentials of transnational actors?

The use of allegedly undemocratic methods is another aspect of the potential democratic deficit of transnational actors, on which systematic research is lacking. From the perspective of deliberative democratic theory, the coercive and confrontational methods of the more radical parts of transnational civil society are seen as problematic. The tools of arguing and communicative action are central to the
The activities of social movements, however, are often confrontational and coercive and, hence, do not fit well within a deliberative democratic framework. From a social movement perspective, the ideal of deliberative democracy can be criticized on the ground that deliberation does not work in societies characterized by structural inequalities. Direct activism and opposition like street-marches, boycotts, or sit-ins are often necessary to achieve social change (Young 2001; Medearis 2004). This tension between deliberation and coercive activism within transnational civil society will be analyzed within this research program.

There is insufficient theoretical understanding of the implications of this tension for the democratization of global governance. There is also a lack of empirical research as to how this tension is played out within different parts of an emerging global civil society. This program aims at filling both these gaps in extant research by addressing the following questions: What is the democratic legitimacy of different methods used by various types of transnational actors? How can deliberative as well as coercive and confrontational methods be legitimated normatively? How does the choice of methods by transnational actors affect the possibilities for democratizing global governance?

**Theory, Method and Case Selection**

Theoretically, this research program is committed to pluralism, and our ambition is to apply alternative analytical perspectives and test competing hypotheses. More specifically, we intend to draw primarily (but not exclusively) on three bodies of theory, each of which offers a set of alternative perspectives and hypotheses. All three analytical themes in this program raise questions about standards and conceptions of democracy in global governance. For these purposes, we will draw on normative democratic theory, as originally developed in the domestic context, and more recently extended to the global level. Yet, while helping us to establish standards against which to measure democracy in global governance, normative democratic theory says little or nothing about the processes leading to that goal. For these purposes, we turn to two other bodies of theory: democratization theory in comparative politics, and theories of institutional design in international relations. Together, these two strands offer a rich menu of hypotheses about the driving factors in processes of democratization in global governance.

The comparative orientation of this research program is one of its distinctive marks and strengths. Whereas existing research is dominated by single case studies of transnational mobilization and democratizing reforms in individual areas of global governance, we will generate comparisons across a broad range of empirical fields.

Our choice of comparative case studies as the main methodological approach is a product of the research problems we wish to explore, which require detailed tracing of empirical processes, and the intermediate number of cases at hand, precluding statistical methods. Comparative case studies allow us to engage in in-depth empirical analysis, while simultaneously permitting us to isolate the influence of specific factors across cases through standard techniques, such as structured focused comparison (Mill 1872; Lijphart 1971; George and Bennett 2005).
At the most general level, we intend to map and compare democratization processes (or their absence) in each of our empirical fields. Yet, in practice, our comparative empirical analysis is more fine-grained. Each empirical field contains multiple international institutions, multiple forms of public-private partnerships, and multiple transnational actors. It is only through a careful selection of cases within, and comparison across, these empirical fields that we can generate answers to the research questions specified in relation to our three analytical themes.

We address the first theme of the research program in relation to five empirical referents, drawn from multiple issue-areas: the European Union (regional integration), the World Trade Organization (trade), the World Bank (development), the World Health Organization (health), and the United Nations Environmental Programme (environment). These international institutions display extensive variation in the extent to which they have opened up formal or informal channels of access and participation for transnational actors. While the EU offers the most highly institutionalized inclusion of transnational actors, the WTO and the WHO have been more restrictive. The World Bank engages in operational collaboration with civil society organizations in the execution of its projects, and consults with representatives of the NGO community in the NGO-World Bank Committee. The UNEP has since its inception offered multiple channels of communication and collaboration with civil society, and the three UN environmental conferences organized since the early 1970s are often referred to as break-through events for civil society participation in multilateral policymaking.

We address the second theme of the program by examining the institutionalization of cooperation between public and private actors through public-private partnerships (PPPs). The rapid spread of new global governance arrangements leads to questions on how to secure values such as participation, representation, accountability, and effectiveness (c.f. Lipschutz 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Chambers and Green 2005). The UN Global Compact is the most high-profile and well-researched public-private partnership to date, involving a wide range of actors and spanning the fields of human rights, labor rights, the environment, and anti-corruption. Other issue-areas of interest include the environment, finance and investment, health, security and armed conflict, and development. We will choose cases to ensure variation across issue-areas, the degree of institutionalization and ambition, and the kinds of actors involved.

In addressing the third theme of the program, we will examine the democratic credentials of those transnational actors which cooperate with the international institutions and take part in the public-private partnerships studied under theme one and two, as well as those which try to promote their version of global democratization from outside, like various global protest movements. In our selection of cases we seek variation in two major respects. First, there should be variation in issue-area. Similar to the other research themes, the intention is to cover a broad range of (partly overlapping) transnational issue-areas. Issues on which we do not expect transnational cooperation are of special interest. Hence, we focus not only on environmental issues and trade and development (where transnational corporations as well as a very large number of civil society actors are active), but also on
health, security and armed conflict, and migration – issue-areas in which state interests have tended to dominate over transnational actors.

Second, we will include a wide variety of different types of transnational actors. Transnational corporations as well as transnational civil society actors (including NGOs, social movements, and activist networks) will be analyzed. In addition to case studies of individual actors, we select cases in which several different transnational actors are involved. This will allow for comparisons of democratic credentials of different kinds of transnational actors being active in the same issue-area and interacting with each other.

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